We develop a simple model of technology differences across countries that combines two ideas: poor countries face "barriers" to technology adoption, and different countries choose "appropriate technologies" that fit their factor endowments. We estimate this model, and find evidence that both mechanisms are at play. Consistent with the "appropriateness" view, poor countries appear to choose relatively unskill-complementary technologies. Consistent with the "barriers" view, poor countries seem to have access to many fewer options when they choose technology. In fact, the presence of appropriate-technology considerations enhances the role of barriers in quantitatively accounting for the World income distribution.
Introduction
Technology differences across countries play a prominent role in recent attempts to explain the World income distribution. Development-accounting studies decompose output differences into a component due to observed factors of production, and a component due to overall technological efficiency, or total factor productivity (TFP). Since poor countries are found to have relatively low TFP, this literature concludes that there are countries that have superior technology relative to others. Poor countries, therefore, face some "barriers" to technology adoption that contribute to keeping them poor.
And yet there is an older tradition where the phrase "technology differences" is taken to mean something very different. In models of "appropriate technology," different countries will choose different technologies, according to which production methods are best suited to the factors that are abundant in each country. Hence, for example, countries abundant is unskilled labor will tend to operate technologies that are very different from those used in skill-abundant countries.
At a fundamental level, both views seem right. For "barriers" to technology adoption, the development-accounting literature offers rather overwhelming evidence. But the appropriate-technology idea, while not systematically explored empirically, is deeply intuitive: it seems obvious that India, with an illiteracy rate of almost 50%, will not benefit from copying Japan's current production methods exactly. This paper attempts a reconciliation of the two views.
A key, almost tautological, observation is that, if appropriate technology effects are to be incorporated into the analysis, technology differences cannot be factor neutral. If they were, there would be nothing to choose from, and the appropriate technology would be the same for all countries, independent of factor endowments. Hence, our first step is to abandon the "TFP" framework so far prevalent in development accounting, and adopt an aggregate production function that allows for non-neutrality, i.e. for the possibility that some technologies deliver more efficiency units for, say, skilled labor, and some others for unskilled labor. A "technology," then, is a particular realization of the vector of efficiencies associated with the various inputs. The core idea of appropriate-technology models is that -in choosing their production methods -countries face a trade-off: increases in the efficiency with which an input is used come at the cost of reductions in the efficiency of (at least) another input.
Again, without such a trade-off, there would be no sense in which appropriate-technology 1 depends on factor endowments. We model this trade-off by assuming that each country faces a "technology frontier." On this frontier, firms in countries with, say, a relatively large endowment of skilled workers will tend to choose skilled-labor complementary technologies, while countries with more abundant unskilled labor will tend to operate unskilled-labor complementary technologies.
In order to incorporate the "barriers" view of technology differences, we let the technology frontiers be country specific. For the World as a whole, the location of the technology frontier depends on the current state of technological progress. By introducing new technologies that dominate some of the pre-existing ones on the frontier, technological progress shifts this locus out. However, the idea in the "barriers" literature is that countries differ for a variety of technological, institutional, and perhaps even cultural idiosyncracies that lead to differences in the set of technologies they can implement. In our framework this maps into "higher" or "lower" country frontiers: high-barrier countries will have access to subsets of the technologies accessible to low-barrier countries. The axes in this figure are the efficiencies of skilled labor and unskilled labor. example, in the figure, the locus B describes the frontier of a country with fewer barriers to technology adoption than country A. On this "higher" frontier, country B will choose B a if it is unskilled-abundant, and B b if it is skill abundant.
The following metaphor may be helpful in thinking about our framework. Suppose that in each country there is a library, containing blueprints, or recipes to turn inputs into output. Each blueprint is associated with a different realization of the efficiency vector. For example, there is a blueprint entitled "computer-controlled processing," that leads to high skill-labor efficiency and low unskilled-labor efficiency; and one called "assembly line" that is associated with an opposite pattern of efficiencies. Firms in each country have to pick a blueprint from the library, and they will tend to pick the one that makes the most of the factors that are abundant in that country. Of course, if there happens to be a blueprint that dominates all others -i.e. that delivers efficiencies for all inputs higher than all other blueprints -then the technology-choice problem becomes trivial. This is the case where the frontiers in Figure 1 are rectangular. But then, once more, there is no issue of an appropriate technology. In the general case there will be multiple non-dominated technologies, injecting curvature into the frontiers. The different country-specific frontiers can further be interpreted as library sizes. Some countries have just a handful of blueprints that fit on a short shelf, while some others have roomfuls of them.
We estimate a model with the above-described features to assess which of these views is important in thinking about cross-country differences in technology. The answer is: both.
In order to assess the importance of appropriateness, we compute the (counterfactual) costs of using inappropriate technologies. Suppose, for example, that country A is unskilled abundant, so that it optimally uses (conditional on its frontier A) technology A a . By how much would output fall if, instead, it used a technology more appropriate for a skill-abundant more straightforward.
country, such as A b ? As it turns out: a lot. For example, if we define A b as the technology that would be appropriate for a country with the United States' factor endowments, the poorest countries in the World would experience a 60% drop in GDP by moving from A a to A b . Hence, appropriateness matters.
An additional striking -and unexpected -testament to the importance of appropriateness, is that poor countries seem to use unskilled labor more efficiently than rich ones, or that there is a negative cross-country correlation between the efficiencies of skilled and unskilled labor (and between the efficiencies of capital and unskilled labor). Consider again the world of Figure 1 , and imagine that country A is unskilled abundant (and hence uses A a ) and country B is skill-abundant (uses B b ). An increase in the importance of appropriateness pushes A a to the right and B b to the left, and contributes to a negative cross-country correlation between the efficiency of skilled labor and the efficiency of unskilled labor. On the other hand, a strengthening of the barriers pushes the locus B further away from A, contributing to a positive correlation between efficiencies (keep pushing B higher and eventually the correlation becomes positive). In the figure, and -more importantly -in the data, the first effect dominates.
Yet this does not mean that barriers are small. If the importance of appropriateness is measured by moving along a given frontier, the role of barriers is captured by the distance across different countries' frontiers. We measure this distance by computing the (counterfactual) gains or losses in output that would arise from increasing or lowering a country's frontier. Suppose, for example, that we "lifted" country A's frontier from A to B. If A is unskilled-abundant, it will choose technology B a . By how much would this change in technology increase country A's output? As it turns out, again, a lot. For example, some of the poorest countries in the World would experience a 6-fold output increase by moving from A a to B a .
Indeed, an accounting exercise reveals that technological barriers, when combined with appropriate-technology considerations, play even more important a role in explaining cross-country income differences than they do in standard development-accounting exercises with factor-neutral technologies. The reason is that the appropriate choice of technology dampens the effects of differences in factor endowments: countries with "poor" endowments can "remedy" by tailoring their technology choice to their factor supplies, an option denied to them when all differences are factor neutral. In a way, therefore, our results deepen the puzzle of the great dispersion of per-capita income around the world, and make it even more 4 important that we understand deviations from best practice at the country level.
2 Section 2 contains a more detailed review of the contributions in the two literatures we are combining: development accounting, and appropriate technology. We then present a reduced-form model that nests the two views (Section 3); our econometric approach (Section 4); the data (Section 5); and the results (Sections 6 and 7). Robustness issues are tackled in Section 8, while Section 9 digs deeper into our striking finding that poor countries use unskilled labor more efficiently. Section 10 concludes.
2 Literature Review: Development Accounting and Appropriate Technology
The "barriers" view of technology differences emerged from a debate on the relative importance of factor endowments and productivity in explaining cross-country income differences.
Initiated by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) , this literature featured contributions by, among others, Islam (1995) , Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) , Rodriguez (1997), Hall and Jones (1997) , and Parente and Prescott (2000) . These studies start out by postulating an aggregate production function, and use data on inputs and outputs to infer differences in technology. For example, the production function could be
where are widely available, and the parameters α and β can either be estimated, or calibrated from other sources of evidence. Then, differences is A i can be determined as residuals: differences in GDP that cannot be explained by factor inputs are attributed to differences in TFP. This is of course analogous to the growth-accounting practice of assigning the fraction of GDP growth that cannot be explained by input growth to technological progress, which is why these studies have come to be described as "development accounting." The current consensus in the development accounting literature is that TFP differences bear at least 50% of the responsibility for the wide observed disparities in per-capita income. In turn, these TFP 2 Clearly the conclusion that differences in factor endowments play a relatively small role in determining income differences may change if the barriers that cause different countries to be on different frontiers depend themselves on endowments. We return to this issue below.
differences are attributed to barriers to technology adoption, leading to a growing literature investigating possible causes for these barriers. Popular explanations include vested interests, institutional failure, geography, financial development, and many other hypotheses.
The "appropriate-technology" idea, that countries with different factor endowments will use different technologies, is at least as old as Hicks (1932) . Over time, it has been extensively used to understand the role of agriculture in development [e.g. Schultz (1964) , and especially Hayami and Ruttan (1971) ]. One relatively early formalization is provided by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) , while more recent theoretical explorations of some of its implications have been carried out, among others, by Diwan and Rodrick (1991) , Basu and Weil (1998) , and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) . Other than by appealing to the appropriate-technology tradition, our introduction of technology frontiers could alternatively be motivated by recent developments in US labor markets. For example, Katz and Murphy (1992) , Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) , Krueger (1993) , Acemoglu (1998 ), Caselli (1999 , and several others have argued that a bias towards skilled-labor in recently adopted technologies is the main reason for the large observed increases in wage inequality. Also, Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) , Dunne and Schmitz (1995) , Allen (1996) , Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997) , Dunne, Haltiwanger and Troske (1997) , and others have documented with plant or firm level data that relative employment and relative wages of skilled workers vary systematically with the type of technology used.
In the face of vast differences in factor endowments across countries, such strong evidence that different technologies are complementary with different factors of production necessarily raises the question of technology choice.
This point is further underscored by recent additions to this literature. Caselli and Coleman (2002) and Ruiz-Arranz (2002) both find, using very different methods, negative trends since the mid-70s in the factor-specific efficiency of unskilled labor in the US. This implies that recent technological changes have hurt the productivity of unskilled workers not 3 See also Zeira (2000) . The present contribution is especially close to Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) in that both papers focus on the role of the relative endowments of skilled and unskilled labor as the key determinants of each country's appropriate technology. However, in Acemoglu and Zilibotti developing countries are forced to use the same technology as the developed ones. Instead, in our model all countries choose the technology most appropriate given their factor supplies and their technology frontier. only in relative terms (i.e. relative to skilled workers), but in absolute terms as well. In other words, if one plots the recent evolution of the efficiencies of skilled labor and unskilled labor in the US, one gets something that looks like curves A or B in Figure 1 .
3 Model
Studies based on Cobb-Douglas specifications of the aggregate production function -for which there is no distinction between the efficiency of the different inputs -are by construction incapable of detecting appropriate-technology effects. To accommodate such effects, it is necessary to generalize equation (1) to allow different inputs to have different efficiencies.
One such framework is the production function proposed by Fallon and Layard (1975) , and recently used by Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000) :
In (2), the TFP term has been broken down in a triple of efficiencies: A 5 As anticipated, our specification of the production process in equation (2) allows skilled and unskilled labor to be imperfect substitutes, and -more importantly -it allows technological change to augment unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital differently. The Cobb-Douglas case is nested in (2) as the special case in which both σ and ρ tend to 0. The case σ > ρ is consistent with a form of capital-skill complementarity.
The representative firm in country i maximizes profits by optimally choosing factor inputs and technology. We assume that product and factor markets are perfectly competitive, 4 Our paper is also closely related to work by Trefler (1993) , who has argued that country-specific augmentation of factor supplies (which can be interpreted as country-specific efficiency levels) helps explain jointly the pattern of trade in factor services and cross-country differences in factor prices. A by-product of his technique is a full set of estimates of efficiency levels for each country and each factor, i.e. something analogous to the set of estimates we obtain. However, Trefler's disaggregation of the labor aggregate is very different from ours, so the two sets of estimates are not easily compared. The two studies, however, share the basic conclusion that non-factor neutral technology differences across countries are critical to fit international data.
5 Diamond, McFadden, and Rodriguez (1978) show that time-varying (country-varying) elasticities of substitution cannot be separately identified from time-varying (country-varying) efficiency parameters. We follow the literature (e.g. Weitzman, 1970, Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante, 2000) in getting around this by assuming that σ and ρ do not vary across countries. We model the appropriate-technology trade-off by the following description of the feasible technology set:
where
This says that, on the boundary of the feasible menu -on the technology frontier -changing technology involves a trade-off between unskilled labor, on the one hand, and skilled labor and capital, on the other. This is clearly a special case of the more general appropriate-technology idea, which would have allowed for an additional trade-off between skilled labor and capital. We make this assumption exclusively for technical convenience, but we do not believe it to be severely restrictive. Skilled-labor and capital endowments are highly correlated, so in practice allowing for an additional potential trade-off would have little empirical impact: countries that want relatively high efficiency of skilled labor would also want relatively high efficiency of capital, so we would be unlikely to observe countries trading off the two. The particular functional form of equations (3) and (4) is also dictated by technical convenience. It is, however, rather flexible, and it does get at the central message of the theory of appropriate technology.
We also want our model to nest the central message of the "barriers" approach to cross-country technology differences. In this view, some countries have lower overall efficiency than others, because of generic impediments to the diffusion and adoption of technology.
Here, we capture this view by allowing the technology frontier in equations (3) and (4) to be country-specific, as implied by the "i" superscripts on the parameters
Hence, while all countries face some trade-off between maximizing the efficiency of one factor versus another, some countries' trade-off takes place at a "higher" overall level than others. For flexibility, we also allow the slope of the trade-off to vary across countries.
Our representation of the technology frontier is convenient because the firm's technologychoice problem boils down to choosing A u . Clearly, no firm will choose a dominated technology so combinations of (A u , A s , A k ) that are not on the frontier are irrelevant. This means that a choice of A u uniquely also determines the values of A s and A k . We conclude that in each country the representative firm maximizes profits (2), (3), and (4).
The first-order conditions with respect to factor inputs are the standard ones. In each country, the marginal productivity of capital must equal the rental rate of capital, r i :
Furthermore, from the condition that each of the two wage rates, w i s and w i u , equals the marginal productivity of the corresponding labor aggregate, we get:
Finally, the first order condition with respect to A u is:
This condition says that at an optimum a unit increase in A i u has no effect on output: the increase through larger efficiency of unskilled workers (left hand side) is completely offset by the corresponding decline through lower efficiency of skilled workers and capital. 6 The appendix considers the possibility that the optimal choice of technology involves identical firms using different technologies; such an outcome turns out to be suboptimal for our model at the parameter values we estimate. The existence of a solution to the firm's problem follows from the continuity of the objective function and compactness of the constraint set. The uniqueness of a solution may depend on values of the parameters of the model. Indeed, for some parameter values the objective function as it depends on A i u (using eqs. (3) and (4) This relationship then says that in equilibrium countries with a relatively large skilledlabor share in output will tend to choose relatively skill-complementary technologies, or that countries will try to implement technologies that augment the factors that absorb a large share of income. Because -as we document below -the skilled-labor share tends to be large in countries with a large endowment of skilled labor, we expect these countries (i.e. rich countries) to adopt skilled-labor augmenting technologies. For the other special case, suppose that a 
Estimation
The observables in the model described above are the input and output quantities,
s , and K, and the input prices w u , w s , and r. From these observables we wish to infer the unobservable levels of technology, A We assume that the country-specific parameters of the technology frontier (3) and (4) are stochastic deviations from the parameters of an "average" World Technology Frontier.
In particular,
where the εs are random variables, and a 0 , a 1 , b 0 , and b 1 are "average" values of the parameters of the technology frontier. In other words, the εs now capture the barriers individual 7 The factor shares are endogenous to the choice of technology. To see how the choice of technology relates to factor endowments consider the special case where output is a function of only two inputs,
Note that ω − σ > 0 is a necessary and sufficient condition for an interior optimum, so, with σ > 0 -which is typically considered to be the empirically relevant range -countries with abundant unskilled labor will choose relatively unskilled-labor augmenting technologies. Note that 1/(1 − σ) is the elasticity of substitution. Hence, when inputs are good substitutes it makes sense to make the most of the abundant input. See Acemoglu (2002) for similar results in the context of endogenous growth models.
countries face in implementing the various best practices. Notice that we have assumed these deviations from the average frontier to be known to firms at the time of their choice of technology. However, they are not observed by the econometrician. This approach to modeling the frontier is close in spirit to the literature on frontier production functions in empirical production economics [see Greene (1997) for an especially useful survey].
In practice, then, we treat a country's frontier as a stochastic deviation from the world average. This amounts to treating the "barriers" to technology adoption featured in the development-accounting literature as "residuals," which is exactly the approach taken in that literature. In development-accounting, the barriers are the additional unobservable sources of cross-country income differences that one cannot account for by using factor endowments alone. This is how we treat them here: in a world where all income differences were explained by factor endowments, all countries would have to lie on the same frontier. If we estimate "large" εs, this implies that -as in the "barriers" literature -factor endowments do not fully explain cross-country income differences.
We also attempt to capture a cross-country correlation in the barriers that may be due to the fact that countries close together may experience similar impediments or adopt similar policies. In order to do so, we borrow techniques that have been developed in the spatial econometrics literature (e.g. Anselin, 1998) . Define ε u (ε s , ε k ) as the vector that collects all the individual ε i u s (ε i s s, ε i k s). We model these vectors as
where λ u , λ s , and λ k are scalars, W is a square, symmetric matrix that captures the spatial correlation, and the ηs are vectors of normal random variables. There is no spatial correlation in the ηs (i.e. η i x is uncorrelated with η j y for i 6 = j, x, y = u, s, k), but we do allow for withincountry correlation between the three sources of deviations from the world frontier. Hence, we assume
where Σ is symmetric and positive semi-definite.
As for the spatial structure, we first establish a distance threshold: two countries are considered "close" if their bilateral geographical distance is less than the threshold, and "remote" otherwise. In our calculations this criterion for closeness is 2,000 kilometers apart.
The results are not very sensitive to relatively small changes in this cutoff. For each country i, we also compute the number of close countries, n i . Then, we construct the matrix W by setting W ij = 0 if countries i and j are distant, and W ij = 1/n i if they are close (by convention, W ii = 0). In practice, this implies that the deviation from the average frontier of country i depends on the average of the deviations of the countries that are considered close to i. The strength of this dependence is a function of the parameters λ u , λ s and λ k .
These assumptions allow us to generate a likelihood function for the parameters (σ, ρ, a 0 , a 1 , b 0 , b 1 , λ u , λ s , and λ k ). In particular, given choices for these parameters, equations (2), (3), (4) (with equality), (5), (6), (8), and (the relevant rows of) (9) are nine equations in the nine unknowns
With the ηs at hand, one can construct the log-likelihood for that particular choice of parameters. Barro and Lee (1993) . The data break down the population of each country into seven categories: no education, some primary, completed primary education, some secondary, completed secondary education, some higher, and completed higher education. We construct L i u as an aggregate of workers with no education and with some primary education, while L i s includes all other groups. Hence, we treat basic literacy as the key requirement for relatively skilled-labor complementary technologies. We believe this definition of "skilled" to be reasonable in the context of a sample that includes many countries with very high illiteracy levels. We should note, however, that the main results not particularly sensitive to it, as we briefly discuss below. These data are for the year 1985. 8 One limitation of our approach is that it assumes the endowments of skilled and unskilled labor to be exogenous with respect to the determinants of barriers to technology adoption, as captured by the εs. If this assumption is violated our parameter estimates will be biased. There is no reliable cross-country data on r i . To get around this problem, we assume that capital is perfectly mobile across countries, so that there is a common world interest of education, as well as data (by Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee) on the duration of various schooling levels in different countries. Hence, we weigh education sub-groups so that each sub-group's weight reflects that group's earnings relative to those of the "base" sub-group (primary completed for L s ). This amounts to assuming that log-wages are linear in years of schooling both within and between the sub-categories constituting L There are 52 countries with complete data for
, and r i ; this data set is reproduced in appendix Table A.1. Table 1 reports some basic statistics from the data set. In this sample output per worker in the richest country is 19 times higher than that in the poorest country. The supplies of skilled and unskilled workers also vary widely across countries (the implied ratio between L s and L u ranges from 0.32 to 36.11). As for the skilled wage premium, in some countries skilled workers receive only a 10 percent higher wage rate than unskilled workers, whereas in other countries skilled workers receive over 3 times as much as a typical unskilled worker. Our measure of the cost of capital varies from 13 to 42 percent. As expected, output is strongly positively correlated with both capital and the supply of skilled labor, while it is strongly negatively correlated with the supply of unskilled labor. As Bils and Klenow have documented, output is also negatively correlated with the skilled wage premium. Not surprisingly, then, the relative supply of skilled labor is negatively correlated with the skilled wage premium. Output is also negatively correlated with the cost of capital.
It is also important to note for later reference that, given national account identities, from data on Y , rK, w s /w u , L s and L u we can back out implicit estimates of w u and w s , as well as the shares in output of skilled labor, unskilled labor, and capital. Figure 2 plots against the log of per-capita income the estimates of w u and w s . It is surely the case that both skilled and unskilled wage rates are higher in rich countries than in poor countries, and the figure shows that our data are consistent with this fact. Hence, rich countries have the lowest skilled wage premium (as we saw in Table 1 ), but also the highest skilled wage rate. 
Results
Maximum Likelihood estimates of the model are reported in Table 2 . Many of the parameters are estimated relatively precisely. The point estimate of σ is .13, and that of ρ is −2. These numbers are consistent with a form of capital-skill complementarity. We also find considerable curvature in the technology frontiers (ω = 1 is the linear case), as well as quantitatively severe trade-offs between the various inputs' efficiencies on the average frontiers (modest trade-off would be implied by a 1 and b 1 close to zero). Finally, the economic significance of the spatial correlation parameters λ is considerable (roughly speaking, they imply that within sets of nearby countries, the correlation among the deviations from the average frontier is about 20 percent), but statistically the estimates are not different from zero. the average frontier. This is consistent with the "barriers" view of technology differences.
Recall that by construction each country's technology lies on a country-specific technology frontier. One clear implication of Figure 4 is that there is dispersion in these frontiers around the average: broadly speaking, some countries have "higher" frontiers than others. We will soon try to assess the quantitative significance of this dispersion.
The other interesting qualitative feature of Figure 4 is that there is a negative crosscountry correlation between the efficiencies of skilled and unskilled labor: by and large, countries that use skilled labor efficiently use unskilled labor inefficiently (the correlation coefficient is -0.69). This is consistent with the "appropriate technology" view of technology differences. As we explain in the Introduction, if appropriate-technology effects are relatively minor compared with the size of the barriers that limit poor countries' access to technology, we should observe a positive correlation between efficiencies -even if each country is on a negatively-sloped frontier. The striking pattern of negative correlation we find is a testament to the strength of appropriateness. We stress that this is not to say, however, that barriers are unimportant to understand cross-country income differences, as we will soon document. 
Quantifying Appropriateness and Barriers
We now turn to a quantitative assessment of the qualitative features highlighted in Figures 4 and 5. In order to assess the quantitative importance of appropriateness, we ask the following question: holding constant the technology frontier, by how much would a country's GDP change, should this country operate a technology (a triple of As) different from the appropriate one? In other words, we assess the output consequences of movements along a given technology frontier. In the first experiment, we (counterfactually) assume that all countries have access to the US frontier. Specifically, we compute the level of GDP associated with an optimal (appropriate) choice of technology on the US technology frontier. We then compare this number with the level of GDP the same country would have if forced to use the technology of the United States. In other words, for each country we compare two points on the US technology frontier: the one corresponding to that country's optimal choice, and the one corresponding to the optimal choice of the US. 16
The result of this experiment is plotted in Figure 6 , where the vertical axis measures the ratio of US-technology GDP to appropriate-technology (on US frontier) GDP; and the horizontal axis measures actual per-capita output. As can be seen, the adoption of an inappropriate technology involves very large output losses -up to almost 70% of GDPthe more so the more different the levels of development (and hence factor endowments).
A similar experiment, with a similar message, is reported in Figure 7 . Here, instead of comparing points on the US frontier, we compare points on the average frontier. For country i the vertical axis measures GDP at US-appropriate technology (on the average frontier) as a ratio of GDP at country i-appropriate technology (on the average frontier). Again, forcing countries to deviate from their appropriate technology causes spectacular output losses. We interpret these findings as indicating that appropriate-technology considerations play an important role in determining technology differences across countries.
Next, we turn to a quantitative assessment of the "barriers" to technology adoption. If the role of appropriateness could be gleaned by movements along a constant frontier, looking at barriers involves some measure of the (economic) distance between different frontiers. would obtain if it had access to the US technology frontier. Hence, we now compare two points on different technology frontiers: the one corresponding to that country's optimal choice on the US frontier, and the one corresponding to its optimal choice on its own frontier.
Both points are "appropriate," but they are conditional on different choice sets. The Figure   shows staggering effects from barriers to technology adoption, with output increasing by up to a factor of 7 if such barriers were removed. Figure 9 shows that the barriers are very severe even just to reach the average frontier: just by obtaining access to the average frontier countries can obtain output gains of up to a factor of 4.
It is clear from the last two figures that poor countries tend to disproportionately be the ones that would gain the most by having access to the technological menu of the US, or indeed the technological menu of the average country. Hence, there is clearly strong quantitative support for the development-accounting view according to which poor countries are generally inside the "world" technology frontier. Indeed, as anticipated in the Introduction, adding appropriate-technology considerations should deliver an upwardly revised estimate of the role of "barriers" (relative to factor endowments) in explaining cross-country income differences. To reiterate the intuition: when countries are allowed to choose optimally from a menu of technologies, this optimal choice may dampen the effect of differences in endowment on differences in income.
11
To check this, we can compute the cross-country variation of per-capita income that would be predicted by this model if all countries had access to the same set of potential technologies. This is analogous to the exercise in the development-accounting literature,
where it is asked how GDP would vary if there were no differences in TFP. In our model, if each country could choose the point on the average frontier that maximizes its outputgiven its labor endowments -the standard deviation of the log of per capita GDP would be 0.30. This compares to a value of 0.8 in the data. Hence, differences in inputs explain just under 40 percent of the observed disparity of incomes, while the rest is explained by barriers to technology adoption -i.e. by the fact that different countries have different frontiers. As discussed in Section 2, models in which technological choice is factor neutral lead to a roughly 50-50 split of the responsibility for the variation of income between factor endowments and differences in technology, so we confirm that marrying "barriers" with "appropriateness" makes the former look even bigger.
Robustness
In this section, we explore how our empirical results change under alternative choices of data and functional forms.
First, we experiment with an alternative definition of "skilled," where a worker is considered skilled when he has completed a secondary education (instead of primary, as in the previous section). This generates efficiency patterns that are broadly similar to those depicted in Figures 4 and 5. The correlation between log(A s ) and log(A u ) is -.73, and the one between log(A k ) and log(A u ) is -.81. The output losses associated with movements away from the appropriate technology on the US and on the average frontiers are similar in magnitude to those in the baseline case. The output gains by jumping to the US frontier are a bit smaller than in the benchmark case, but still huge: the maximum gain is a factor of 11 Heuristically, in the appropriate-technology framework one asks what would income dispersion be if all countries had triples of A u , A s , and A k chosen from the same frontier, while in the factor-neutral approach one asks what would the dispersion of incomes be if all countries used the same triple of A u , A s , and A k If this "TFP triple" is close to the optimal choice of endowment-rich countries, the appropriate-technology framework will assign less of a role to factor differences than the TFP framework; while if the TFP triple is close to the optimal choice of endowment-poor countries, the role of factor endowments will be magnified in the appropriate-technology approach.
5.5). Finally, the counterfactual log output variance when all countries are on the average frontier is 0.31, i.e. essentially the same as in the baseline case.
12
It goes without saying that collecting all workers in just two groups is coarse at best, even though our procedure allows workers with more education to contribute more efficiency units than less educated workers in the same broad category. We therefore also experimented with a three-group breakdown, which is essentially equivalent to combining our main "cut"
with the one in the previous robustness check. Hence, we have the unskilled, L u , who have not completed a primary education; the "semi-skilled", L p , who have completed a primary education but not a secondary one; and the skilled, L c , who have a complete secondary education. To minimize the number of additional parameters, we use the simplest possible generalizations of (2), (3) and (4), i.e.
Everything else is the same as before. Nothing particularly new or surprising emerges from this experiment. The correlations between log(A u ) and the other efficiency parameters are all strongly negative (in excess of -.8). There are large output losses from movements along the US or the average technology frontier, and the output gains from gaining access to the US frontier are large -if, again, a bit smaller than in the baseline case. The log-output variance when all countries are using their appropriate technology on the US frontier is 0.29.
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Finally, we checked robustness to an alternative nesting of the production function.
The main results of the paper are based on the nesting
, we find the usual dispersion of observed efficiencies around the world average frontier. One difference is that the correlation between log(A u ) and log(A s ) is now slightly positive (the one between log(A k ) and log(A u ) is still negative). As explained in the Introduction, however, this does not imply that appropriate technology is not at work. Indeed, we find output losses from movements away from the appropriate technology on the US or on the average frontier of virtually the same order of magnitude than with the baseline nesting. Same thing for movements to the US (or average) frontier.
The log output variance that would attain if all countries were on the US frontier is a bit larger: 0.45. between A u , on one hand, and A s and A k , on the other. Since high A s and high A k are associated with skill-and capital-rich countries, and these countries are the high income countries, these patterns imply a negative correlation between A u and Y : rich countries use unskilled labor inefficiently. While, as we argued, this is not necessarily surprising if one has in mind appropriate-technology effects, it is very puzzling if one is used to think about technology differences exclusively in TFP terms. Hence, it is worth devoting some space to probing the robustness of this particular result, as well as to uncover the features of the data that give rise to it.
As we showed in Section 4, given parameter values and observable variables, our model delivers nine equations in nine unknowns, where the unknowns include the factorspecific efficiency levels. In solving these equations, it turns out that the solution for A u follows almost directly from the firm's first order condition with respect to the choice of unskilled-labor input, which can be written as
This equation is of course very intuitive. Y /L u is a measure of the scarcity of unskilled labor (relative to skilled labor and capital). Hence, not surprisingly, the unskilled wage is increasing in this variable (recall that σ < 1 by the properties of the constant returns to 14 The parameter estimates are σ = 0.3853, ρ = .3497, ω = 0.5694, a 0 = 5.5792, a 1 = 1.3631, b 0 = 1.3631,
because it does not allow for capital-skill complementarity.
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scale production function). Also, as long as σ > 0, the unskilled wage will be higher, the more efficiency units A u are embodied in an unskilled worker.
Let us now ask what we should observe in a World where A u was constant across countries. Since unskilled labor is scarce (Y /L u is high) in rich countries, the unskilled wage should be increasing in GDP. But how steeply? Given our estimate that σ equals .14, and given the observed distribution of Y/L u , the predicted ratio between w u in the country with the highest per-capita income and w u in the country with the lowest should be of roughly 4.8 log points. As can be easily checked from Figure 2 , this far exceeds the actual observed variation in wages. This is why the data call for a negative correlation between A u and GDP: something is needed to "flatten out" the relationship between w u and GDP that would be predicted by the case where A u is constant (and, a fortiori, by the case in which A u is increasing with income). In sum, the observed profile of unskilled-wage variation with income is "too flat" to be consistent with constant, or increasing, unskilled-labor efficiency.
Inspection of equation (13) Figure 10 , which plots the correlation between log(A u ) and log(Y ) implied by alternative values of σ, confirms that this is the case. A heuristic intuition is as follows. σ is (loosely) related to the ease of substitutability between unskilled labor and the other inputs: the higher σ, the easier this substitutability. But the higher this substitutability, the weaker the effect of increasing unskilled labor scarcity on the unskilled wage. In the limit of perfect substitutability, or σ = 1, increasing unskilled-labor scarcity has no impact on the unskilled wage, and all the work of generating an unskilled wage profile that increases with income must be performed by A u .
A very notable implication of equation (13) is that our estimates of A u exclusively depend on our estimate of σ, and not on our estimates of all the other parameters of the model. Hence, in order to assess the robustness of our negative correlation between A u and GDP, it would be sufficient to compare our estimated value of σ to alternative existing estimates of this parameter. Unfortunately, we are unaware of reliable alternative estimates of the production function we use in this paper. There are several estimates in the literature of the "elasticity of substitution" between skilled and unskilled labor (variously defined), and it would be tempting to interpret them as estimates of 1/(1 − σ). But this would be wrong, as there is no clean mapping between σ and these estimates. For example, Katz and Murphy (1992) retrieve the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor from a regression of the skilled-wage premium on the log of relative labor supplies and a time trend. Inspection of equation (6), however, clearly reveals that -had the purpose been to estimate σ in equation (2) -this regression would be misspecified. Part of the problem is that, with more than two inputs, there are many definitions of the elasticity of substitution.
Another part of the problem is that most methods to estimate these elasticities impose restrictions that are violated by equation (2).
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We should also note that an alternative interpretation for our findings is that the efficiencies A 15 Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000) do estimate the production function (2), from US time series data, and place σ at .4. From Figure 10 , this would essentially imply no correlation between GDP and the efficiency of unskilled labor -which, relative to a TFP view of the world, is almost as striking an implication as the negative correlation implied by our estimate. However, we have several reasons to conjecture that their estimate is "too large" for the purposes of plugging into equation (2) in this paper. First, they use "college completed" as their cut-off for "skilled". If the ease of substitution between illiterate and literate workers is less that the ease of substitution between college and high-school graduates, as seems plausible, then their estimate of σ may be larger than the corresponding parameter when using "primary completed" as a cut-off. Second, and more importantly, they do not allow the As to vary across observations. Recall that σ is related to the ease of substitutability among factors. The more rigid the choice of technology (i.e. the less the As are allowed to vary in response to changes in factor inputs), the more substitutable must the inputs be to account for a given level of income. In other words, subsitutability is a substitute (apologies) for appropriateness. Ruiz Arranz (2002) documents that substantial trends in relative As have been omitted in the Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante exercise. Another study of equation (2) is Duffy, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian (2002) , who use cross-country data, and the same definition for unskilled labor as we do, and obtain estimates of σ ranging from 0.42 to 0.66. However, they too assume that the As are constant across countries, so that, again, we expect their estimate to be biased upward.
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The main message of this paper is that the two views of technology differences -that poor countries face "barriers" to technology adoption, and that different countries choose technology "appropriately" -can be reconciled. Furthermore, a model that nests the two views shows that both have a quantitatively significant impact on the technologies different countries are observed to employ. Indeed, keeping track of appropriate-technology effects leads us to an upward revision of the role of "barriers" in output differences. On the other hand, it also uncovers surprising patterns in the way the efficiency of different inputs varies across countries. In particular, it looks as though poor countries use unskilled labor more efficiently than rich countries.
Given that we find even larger "barrier" effects than previous contributions in development accounting, we hope that our paper will provide further spur to ongoing efforts to uncover the nature of these barriers. Given our evidence that deviations from appropriateness entails large output losses, however, such efforts should be mindful that pushing poor countries to adopt technologies used by rich countries may not be optimal, particularly if poor countries' factor endowments are significantly different from those of rich nations.
Removing barriers should be understood as widening poor countries' choices of technology; not passively copying rich countries' production processes.
The framework developed in this paper could be extended in a number of directions.
First, it would be useful to find a way of relaxing the assumption that skilled-labor endowments are exogenous to the location in space of each country's technology frontier. The interaction between "barriers" and skill accumulation is a potentially important one, and it could shed light on the nature of the barriers themselves. Second, it would be interesting to bring in a dynamic dimension, and try to identify how the average and the country-specific frontiers have evolved over time. Again, this would shed further light on the nature of barriers. Furthermore, it would uncover potential factor-biases in technological change over time.
Third, one could attempt to unpack the aggregate data we used and look at crosscountry barriers and appropriateness at the industry level. A potentially fruitful way to interpret the frontier we identify is not that countries are faced with different ways of producing the same good, but rather that goods may differ in the relative efficiency of different factors. This would provide our model of appropriate technology with roots in the HeckscherOhlin tradition. Repeating our estimates at the industry level would allow us to distinguish 23 between the two interpretations.
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A.2 Multiple-Technology Equilibria
Under some assumptions on the Technology Frontier and the production function, the equilibrium will involve some firms choosing one technology while others choose another technology. In this appendix we describe some conditions that lead to such an outcome, and we verify that this situation does not arise in our paper.
Consider the following example in which multiple technologies arise in equilibrium.
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To simply the exposition, consider a closed economy with a fixed supply of capital K and a fixed supply of labor L (all of one type). Firms produce goods according to the following linear production function,
where the technology frontier is described by
There is no equilibrium in which all firms choose the same technology. Due to the linearity of production and the frontier, firms would either choose A l = 1 or A l = 2. Factor prices consistent with all firms choosing A l = 1 are r = 2 and w = 1. At these factor prices, though, firms would earn higher profits by choosing the A l = 2 technology and hiring only labor.
Factor prices consistent with all firms choosing A l = 2 are r = 1 and w = 2. At these factor prices, though, firms would earn higher profits by choosing the A l = 1 technology and hiring only capital. Hence, there is no equilibrium in which all firms choose the same technology.
The equilibrium is that some firms choose the A l = 1 technology and employ all the capital while other firms choose the A l = 2 technology and employ all the labor; here factor prices are given by r = 2 and w = 2.
For our model, we first compute the optimum common technology and then verify that this is the optimal choice by each individual firm. To compute the optimum common technology we first compute the solution to the appropriate first-order conditions (such as equation (8)) involving the choice of factor inputs and the common technology. The question to ask, then, is if at these factor prices will all firms find it optimal to adopt this common technology? Clearly the common technology and factor inputs that are proportional to the aggregate inputs will satisfy the firm's first-order conditions with respect to the optimal technology and factor inputs. By construction, then, the common technology will be a local optimum for each individual firm. It is important, though, to check the boundary conditions, as this is exactly where we would expect to find a multiple-technology solution.
The two boundary conditions with respect to the choice of technology are ) and hire only skilled labor and capital, so that aggregate output would be (given σ > 0)
To rule out these boundary solutions, we need to verify that firms would not find it profitable to specialize either in using unskilled labor or in using skilled labor and capital (with the appropriate technology). The condition that rules out specializing in unskilled labor is (noting that profits equal zero at the common technology solution)
and the condition that rules out specializing in skilled labor and capital is
(note that in the latter equation K/L s is the capital/skilled labor ratio such that the marginal productivity of capital equals the cost of capital). We numerically verified that both of these conditions hold at our estimates of the parameters. Essentially, this means that at the estimated parameter values we impose a sufficient trade-off of efficiencies on the frontier and a sufficient concavity of the production function (complementarity of the inputs) to rule out multiple technologies. Each country's code measures that country's log unskilled wage, and is connected by a segment to a dot that measures that country's log skilled wage. The skilled and unskilled wages are computed by us as described in the text. Output per worker is in PPP, and is sourced from Hall and Jones (1999) . The figure shows counterfactual calculations of the correlation between the log efficiency of unskilled workers -as would be implied by different values of σ -and log income per worker.
